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Challenges to IHL compliance related to autonomous weapons systems and ROE as a part of the solution
THE CONTINUUM OF COMPETITION

NATO Capstone Doctrine: AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine, Edition F Version 1

Decision Making in the Continuum of Competition

 

ACTIONS in the Continuum of Competition

 

AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS (AWS) Terminology

AWS are weapon systems that select and engage (apply force) to one or more targets without human intervention.

“Without human intervention” means that after initial activation by a human, the application of force is triggered in response to information from the environment received through sensors measuring phenomena, such as heat, light, movement, shape, velocity, weight or acoustic or electromagnetic signals, and on the basis of a generalized “target profile”, such as the shape, infrared or radar “signature”, speed and direction of a type of military vehicle, etc.

Law No.73/2025, AERIAL VEHICLE an object, other than an aircraft, that moves in national airspace with or without its own propulsion, guided or unguided, in any structural form, not limited to missiles, guided munitions, or in any configuration or adapted for military uses.

Current two main trends in military interest and investment include:
  • the rapid integration of AI into targeting processes,
  • the increased autonomy in weapon systems
ROE PURPOSE

1. ROE are issued by competent authorities and assist in the delineation of the circumstances and limitations within which military forces may be employed to achieve their objectives.

2. Whatever their form, they provide authorisation for and/or limits on , among other things, the use of force , the positioning and posturing of force s, and the employment of certain specific capabilities. In some nations, ROE have the status of guidance to military forces; in other nations, ROE are lawful commands.

Categories of SELF DEFENCE:

a. Individual self defence . The right of an individual to defend from an attack or imminent attack.

b. Unit self defence . Unit COMs have the right to defend their unit and other units from their nation in the face of an attack or imminent attack.

c. Protection of Others. This refers to the right to defend specified persons (who are not part of the Force) against an attack or imminent attack.

d. National self defence. As recognised in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, refers to the right of a nation to defend itself against armed attack, and for most nations, the threat of imminent armed attack. Decisions on whether or not national self defence will be invoked are retained at the highest levels of governmental or executive authority.

Use of Force in SELF DEFENCE:
Hostile Act and Hostile Intent.
  • The right to use force in self defence arises in response to a hostile act (attack) and/or demonstrated hostile intent (threat of imminent attack).
  • Higher authority may provide mission specific guidance on indicators of hostile act and hostile intent.
Use of Force in Self Defence.
  • Subject to any limitations promulgated in ROE.
  • Where time and operational circumstances permit, military forces should warn the threatening entity in order to give it an opportunity to withdraw or cease its threatening actions.
  • Military forces are permitted to use force in self defence only if non forceful alternatives to prevent or deter the attack or imminent attack:
    a. Have been exhausted,
    b. Are unavailable, or
    c. Are deemed insufficient to defend forces in those circumstances.
THE USE OF FORCE DURING OPERATIONS

DURING PEACETIME, the use of force is permitted in self defence , in the exercise of law enforcement authority, and to accomplish operations or missions specifically authorised by a higher national authority or other governing body.

DURING ARMED CONFLICT, and in addition to self defence, commanders may be authorised to engage an enemy in accordance with LOAC
  • In international armed conflicts situations, only combatants (unless hors de combat) and civilians directly participating in hostilities and military objectives may be the object of attack. In non international armed conflicts situations, only fighters (unless hors de combat) and civilians directly participating in hostilities and military objectives may be the object of attack.
  • ROE language is generally crafted to reflect a number of recurring LOAC rules and principles concerning the use of force:
    • Military necessity
    • Distinction
    • Proportionality
    • Humanity
    • Precaution
    • Weapon prohibitions (which cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering)
TARGETING AND ROE

Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities, applicable ROE, and LOAC.

The relationship between ROE and targeting is summarized as follows:
  • Forces may target only those military objectives permitted to be targeted in the relevant ROE.
  • ROE may impose policy restrictions on targeting that go beyond the requirements of the LOAC.
  • ROE must never permit targeting that is not consistent with LOAC.
MODEL TARGETING CHECK LIST
  1. Do you have authority under ROE / Orders to conduct attack? If yes proceed to 2. If no DO NOT ATTACK
  2. Is the objective on a No Strike / Restricted Target List? If no proceed to 3. If yes DO NOT ATTACK
  3. Does the target make an effective contribution to enemy military action? If yes proceed to 4. If no DO NOT ATTACK
  4. Will its destruction or neutralization, in current circumstances, offer a definite military advantage? If yes proceed to 5. If no DO NOT ATTACK
  5. Is the attack expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof (i.e. collateral damage)? If yes proceed to 6. If no proceed to 11.
  6. Do your targeting directive and ROE permit collateral damage? If yes proceed to 7. If no DO NOT ATTACK
  7. Is there an alternative military target available with the same military advantage, with less risk of collateral damage? If no proceed to 8. If yes return to 1 for new target
  8. Have all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss or civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects been taken? If yes proceed to 9. If no, do so, and then reassess 8.
  9. Where circumstances permit, has an effective advance warning been given of attacks that may affect the civilian population? If yes proceed to 10. If no, issue warning before proceeding to 10.
  10. Is the attack expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated? If yes DO NOT ATTACK. If no proceed to step 11.
  11. ATTACK PERMITTED BUT CONTINUE TO MONITOR. IF CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE DUTY TO REASSESS ATTACK.
DEVELOPING NEW MEANS OR METHODS OF WARFARE (Autonomous Weapons Systems - AWS)
Some ICRC rules to follow:
  • Prohibit unpredictable AWS , namely those that, due to their design or the circumstances and manner of use, do not allow a human user to understand, predict and explain the system’s functioning and effects.
  • Users of AWS must be able , with a reasonable degree of certainty, to predict the effects of that weapon in order to determine whether it can be directed at a specific military objective, and take steps to limit those predicted effects, as required by IHL. This entails the ability to understand the functioning of the AWS: the nature and functioning of its sensors, the definition of its target profile and the potential effects in the circumstances of use, including any risk of error or malfunction.
  • Prohibit AWS designed or used to target humans directly (anti personnel AWS). This is required because of the significant risk of IHL violations and the unacceptability of anti personnel autonomous weapons from an ethical perspective.
To reduce the risk of violations, new rules must also strictly constrain the development and use of AWS, including through a combination of
  • restricting targets of the AWS to only those that are military objectives by nature;
  • limiting the duration and geographic scope of AWS operation;
  • limiting the scale of use, including the number of engagements that the AWS can undertake
  • limiting the situations of use, namely constraining them to situations where civilians or civilian objects are not present
  • ensuring, to the maximum extent feasible, the ability for a human user to effectively supervise, and in a timely manner, to intervene and, where appropriate, deactivate operation of the AWS Where this is not feasible, the AWS must be equipped with an effective self destruction or self neutralization mechanism
ROE Conclusions
  • ROE are a commander’s tool and responsibility
  • ROE conform to national/ int’l law
  • ROE are approved by the political leadership
  • Self defence is separate from the mission’s ROE – Nothing can limit the inherent right of self defence
  • ROE are usually contained in an annex to the OPLAN
  • ROE education and training essential
References
  • NATO, AJP 01, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE, December 2022.
  • IIHL, SANREMO HANDBOOK ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, 2009.
  • ICRC, AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: SELECTED ISSUES., October 2025.
  • LAW no. 73 of May 19, 2025 regarding the control of the use of national airspace.
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